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STATEMENT SHOWING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COORT 
AND THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to §78-2-2(3)(i) , Utah Code Annotated, and Rule 3(a), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. This appeal is from a final 
order of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
Court in and for Uintah County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Dennis L. Draney presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. When did the "legal malpractice11 occur, that is, 
when the respondent first filed the U.C.C. 1 statement with 
the Lieutenant Governor in 1976, or when he failed to refile 
it or notify the appellant, his client, that he needed to 
refile it in May, 1981? 
2. In "legal malpractice11 cases, when does the Statute 
of Limitations commence to run? Is it when the malpractice 
was committed, May of 1981 when the U.C.C. 1 continuation 
statement was not filed; and/or 1976 when the respondent 
failed to secure the transaction with a mortgage or like 
instrument on real property; or, when the damage occurred, 
with the filing of the bankruptcy in 1983, or when the error 
and omission was discovered after the filing of the bank-
ruptcy? 
3. Are there questions of fact that need to be deter-
mined in order to apply the question of law as to when the 
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Statute of Limitations begin to run, or was it as a matter 
of law, the date the respondent created the initial contract 
in 1976? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case involves a claim for professional negligence 
or legal malpractice resulting in the loss of security to 
secure a debt. The trial court, in considering the respon-
dent's Motion for Summary Judgment, granted judgment in 
which the court concluded the professional negligence or 
legal malpractice, if it occurred, occurred in 1976 when the 
respondent first created the contract, rather than in 1981 
when the respondent failed to either renew a U.C.C. 1 state-
ment or inform the appellant that he needed to renew it. 
The trial court also refused to apply the discovery rule in 
determining when the Statute of Limitations commenced 
running, but rather concluded the applicable Statute of 
Limitations commenced running when the respondent performed 
the initial legal services that should have resulted in the 
securing of the appellant's obligation, and thereby granted 
Summary Judgment in reliance on the Statute of Limitations 
issue in favor of the respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent had been appellant's attorney for many years. 
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Commencing in approximately 1965, he assisted the appellant 
in setting up a recreational vehicle business in Uintah 
County. In 1975 he set up a corporation known as Merkley 
Motors, Inc., and performed all necessary legal services to 
effect the transfer of real and personal property into that 
corporation. (J. Ray Merkley deposition p. 8; John C. 
Beaslin deposition Exhibit #1; and R. 22) 
As of March, 1976, appellant and his then-wife owned 
99% of the capital shares of Merkley Motors, Inc. (R. 23) 
They were offered the sum of One Hundred Twenty Thousand 
Dollars ($120,000.00) from certain relatives, collectively 
referred to as the other Merkleys. (J. Ray Merkley deposi-
tion pp. 11-13) Because respondent had been appellant's 
attorney for many years, and had assisted appellant in all 
of his business matters in which he needed legal advice, and 
had performed all necessary functions to incorporate the 
business and transfer the appellant's real and personal 
property into the corporate structure, the appellant retained 
the respondent as his attorney to appropriately prepare the 
legal documents necessary to effectuate the sale of the 
capital shares of the corporation to the other Merkleys, and 
at the same time, to have sufficient security available to 
cover the sales price in the event of default on the part of 
the other Merkleys in purchasing the capital ownership 
interest represented by the shares in the corporation. The 
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respondent, as the appellant's attorney, undertook to repre-
sent the interests of the appellant in the sale of the 
capital shares of the corporation to the other Merkleys, and 
agreed to draft the appropriate and necessary legal docu-
ments to effectuate the sale of the capital shares of 
Merkley Motors, Inc., which sale was to be secured by the 
real property on which the business was located in Vernal, 
Utah, and by an inventory that was unencumbered which would 
be in excess of any balance owing to the appellant, the 
seller. Appellant advised respondent of what the agreement 
between the buyers and the sellers was to be, namely, that 
the sale price of One Hundred Twenty Thousand Dollars 
($120,000.00), which represented the value of the inventory 
and the net equity of the real property was to be structured 
in such a way as to fully secure the appellant for the 
unpaid balance of the sale price by a security interest in 
both the real property and the unencumbered inventory. 
Respondent agreed to represent the appellant, and prepared a 
contract of sale. (R. 23-30) He also prepared a financing 
statement (hereinafter referred to as a U.C.C. 1) which he 
had filed on May 4, 1976, and in which he listed Merkley 
Motors, Inc. as the debtor, and had Tal R. Merkley and 
Charlene Merkley sign, and in which he listed the appellant 
J. Ray Merkley, and his then-wife Janet Merkley, as the 
secured parties. (R. 31) The respondent did not, contrary 
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to appellant's request, secure the real property asset of 
the corporation by a mortgage or like instrument to the 
appellant, but rather, in a very unworkable and loose docu-
ment, merely provided for the escrow of corporate stock, but 
did not secure the obligation owed by the buyers to the 
appellant seller. (R. 23-30 and R. 41-45) 
Even though the respondent attempted to secure the 
inventory and other personal assets of the corporation by 
the U.C.C. 1 filing on May 4, 1976, he did not set up any 
follow-up procedures for the renewal of that document on a 
periodic basis as reauired by the U.C.C, nor did the 
respondent inform the appellant that the document would have 
to be renewed or refiled on a periodic basis in order to 
retain its validity. (R. 14-16; J. Ray Merkley deposition 
pp. 38-46) Repondent continued to handle the legal matters 
of the appellant as well as the buyers of Merkley Motors, 
Inc. in several subsequent transactions dealing with the 
same asset through 1976, 1977, and 1978. (Exhibit #1, depo-
sition of John C. Beaslin) Respondent did not, however, 
ever advise the appellant that he had not secured the sales 
agreement by a mortgage or trust deed on the real property, 
or that the U.C.C. 1 filing would need to be renewed or 
refiled on a periodic basis in order to retain its validity. 
(R. 14-16; J. Ray Merkley deposition pp. 38-46) The respon-
dent did not renew the U.C.C. 1 filing in May, 1981, when it 
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had to be renewed to maintain the security interest on 
behalf of the appellant, nor did the appellant know that he 
was supposed to file a renewal. As a matter of fact, 
respondent's office staff tried to lead appellant to believe 
that the U.C.C. 1 filings were good indefinately, and did 
not need to be renewed. (J. Pay Merkley deposition pp. 
37-38) 
Merkley Motors, Inc., through its officers, who had 
been the purchasers from the appellant, filed a bankruptcy 
on behalf of Merkley Motors, Inc. in the early part of 1983, 
approximately two years after the U.C.C. 1 filing should 
have been renewed. Because the U.C.C. 1 filing had not been 
renewed, appellant lost his security interest in the inven-
tory, which, at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy was 
in excess of the money owed him by the buyers, and he, 
accordingly, lost the principal sum of $54,360.18, plus 
interest. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in its determination of when the 
error or omission occurred, it actually being in 1981, and 
not in 1976, and also erred in its conclusion as to when the 
Statute of Limitations commenced running in any event. The 




THE ERROR OR OMISSION OF RESPONDENT DID NOT OCCUR UNTIL 
MAY, 1981f WHEN RESPONDENT NEITHER RENEWED THE U.C.C. 1 
FILING NOR INFORMED APPELLANT HE HAD TO RENEW THE U.C.C. 1 
FILING. 
The trial court, in its ruling on the Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, used the contract creation date of March 1, 
1976 as the date on which the Statute of Limitations com-
menced rather than a period five years later, which is the 
time the error actually occurred. 
Section 70A-9-403, UCA, sets the effective periods for 
U.C.C. 1 filings. Subsections (2) and (3) provide: 
11
 (2) Except as provided in subsection (b) 
a filed financing statement is effective 
for a period of five years from the date of 
filing. The effectiveness of a filed fin-
ancing statement lapses on the expiration 
of the five year period unless a continu-
ation statement is filed prior to the lapse. 
If a security interest perfected by filing 
exists at the time insolvency proceedings 
are commenced by or against the debtor, the 
security interest remains perfected until 
terminaton of the insolvency proceedings and 
thereafter for a period of 60 days or until 
expiration of the five year period, which-
ever occurs later. Upon lapse the security 
interest becomes unperfected, unless it is 
perfected without filing. If the security 
interest becomes unperfected upon lapse, it 
is deemed to have been unperfected as against 
a person who became a purchaser or lien 
creditor before lapse. 
(3) A continuation statement may be filed 
by the secured party within six months prior 
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to the expiration of the five year period 
specified in subsection (2). Any such 
continuation statement must be signed by 
the secured party, identify the original 
statement by file number or by entry 
numbers and book and page numbers and 
state that the original statement is 
still effective. A continuation state-
ment signed by a person other than the 
secured party of record must be accom-
panied by a separate written statement of 
assignment signed by the secured party of 
record and complying with subsection (2) 
of section 70A-9-405, including payment of 
the required fee. Upon timely filing of 
the continuation statement, the effective-
ness of the original statement is contin-
ued for five years after the last date to 
which the filing was effective whereupon 
it lapses in the same manner as provided 
in subsection (2) unless another continu-
ation statement is filed prior to such 
lapse. Succeeding continuation statements 
may be filed in the same manner to con-
tinue the effectiveness of the original 
statement. Unless a statute on disposi-
tion of public records provides otherwise, 
the filing officer may remove a lapsed 
statement from the files and destroy it 
immediately if he has retained a micro-
film or other photographic record, or 
in other cases after one year after the 
lapse. The filing officer shall so 
arrange matters by physical annexation 
of financing statements to continuation 
statement or other related filings, or 
by other means, that if he physically 
destroys the financing statements of a 
period more than five years past, those 
which have been continued by a continuation 
statement or which are still effective under 
subsection (6) shall be retained.,f 
Had the contract purchaser filed a bankruptcy any time 
prior to May 4, 1981, the appellant would have been secured 
under the U.C.C. 1 filing. The error and omission of the 
respondent was in not renewing or refiling the U.C.C. 1 
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prior to May 4, 1981, or advising the appellant that he 
would have to renew or refile the U.C.C. 1. The trial court 
applied the Four Year Contract Statute of Limitations, 
§78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated (1953), however, applied it 
from the 1976 time mark and not the 1981 time mark. The 
appellant filed his complaint in July, 1984, a period well 
within four years from the respondent's failure to renew the 
U.C.C. 1 filing in May, 1981. 
To follow the application by the trial court of the 
Statute of Limitations beginning to run in 1976 rather than 
in 1981, you achieve a result of having the Statute of Limi-
tations expire one year before the error in not renewing the 
U.C.C. 1 filing occurred. The trial court plainly used the 
incorrect date as the starting point by taking the date of 
the original contract rather than the date five years later 
when the security for the benefit of the appellant was lost 
by the respondent's failure to act. 
This court recently held in Brigham Young University v. 
aulsen Construction Company, et al., 68 UAR 5 (Utah 1987): 
"The general rule is that a cause of 
action accrues upon 'the happening of 
the last event necessary to . . . the 
cause of action.1" [Citing Becton 
Dickenson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 
1257 (Utah 1983) 
In this case the last event necessary to the cause of 
action was the failure to file the continuation statement 
for the U.C.C. 1 in May, 1981. 
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POINT II 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT COMMENCE TO RON 
UNTIL PLAINTIFF DISCOVERED, OR IN THE EXERCISE OF REASONABLE 
CARE SHOULD HAVE DISCOVERED, THE WRONG COMPLAINED OF, AND 
THE INSTANT LAWSUIT WAS, THEREFORE, TIMELY, 
If the court agrees with the appellant's first point, 
it is really not essential to discuss this point as to the 
loss of the security interest in the personal property 
covered by the U.C.C. 1 filing, however, the court may, 
nonetheless, want to consider this point relative to the 
respondent's failure to secure the obligation created by the 
sales contract by an appropriate mortgage or trust deed. 
While this point should not affect the running of the time 
for the error and omission in not renewing the U.C.C. 1 
filing, it is worthy of consideration relative to the loss 
of the security in the real estate because that error and 
omission occurred in 1976. It was not, however, discovered 
until some time later, nor did the damage result until some 
time later. 
The time when the Statute of Limitations commences to 
run has, for many years, been evolving into a rule of rea-
son. In legal malpractice cases, various state courts have 
adopted rules of reason in determining when the Statute of 
Limitations commences to run. Two different rules have 
evolved, namely, the Damage Rule and the Discovery Rule. To 
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be considered under either rule is the fact of the fiduciary 
relationship that exists between an attorney and a client. 
This court has recognized that trust and confidence are 
basic to the attorney/client relationship. See Smoot v. 
Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962); Omega Inv. Co. v. 
Woolley, 72 Utah 474, 271 P. 797 (1928). Because of the 
fiduciary nature of the attorney/client relationship, the 
courts that have considered the question of when the Statute 
of Limitations commences to run have adopted one of two 
rules, both of which bring you to the same point. The one 
rule is known as the Damage Rule, and simply stated, is that 
there must be actual injury before the cause of action 
accrues. The other is the Discovery Rule, which is that the 
Statute of Limitations does not begin to run until the 
injured party discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable 
care should discover, that there is a wrong to be complained 
of. 
The Damage Rule has grown from a 1967 District of 
Columbia decision of Fort Meyers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. 
Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (DC Cir. 1967) which 
involved a three-year occurrence limitation. On May 16, 
1962, the attorneys prepared a contract for providing that a 
present American registry of the boats would be maintained. 
On July 25, 1962, the boats arrived in Venezuala and were 
impounded because their entry under American registry was 
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illegal. Suit was not filed until July 22, 1965, more than 
three years after the negligent advice was given, but less 
than three years since the seizure of the boats. The United 
States Court of Appeals noted the divergence of use in 
various jurisdictions concerning whether negligence or 
injury initiated the start of the statutory period. The 
District Court had chosen the Occurrence Rule, but the 
Appellate Court said: 
"We see no good reason for drawing such 
a distinction between malpractice suits 
and other negligence actions. The impound-
ing of the boats might have been found to 
be an injury that resulted from Appellees1 
legal advice. Since the suit was filed 
within three years, we think it was timely.11 
Since the Fort Meyers Seafood Packers decision, the 
Damage Rule has been adopted by court decision in Arizona, 
California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 
Texas, and Wisconsin. See Mallen & Levit, Legal 
Malpractice, Second Edition, §390, Note 11 (1981). 
While the Utah court has not yet been called upon to 
rule on the question of when the Statute of Limitations 
begins to run in a legal malpractice case, this court has 
ruled in recent years, under similar circumstances involving 
a fiduciary relationship, that the Statute of Limitations 
does not begin to run until the injured party discovers, or 
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in the exercise of reasonable care should discover, that 
there was a wrong to be complained of. It is really immate-
rial whether you apply the Damage Rule or the Discovery 
Rule, under the facts of this case, because the time which 
the Statute would begin to run is the same. This court, in 
Stewart v. K & S Company, Inc., 591 P.2d 433 (Utah 1979), 
was called upon to determine when the Statute of Limitations 
commenced running against a stockholder who brought a law-
suit against corporate officers. The question was whether 
you should apply an Occurrence Rule, which was applied by 
the trial court in this case, and which would have barred 
the plaintiff's claim by the three year Statute of Limita-
tions. In opting not to apply the Occurrence Rule, this 
court stated: 
"In addressing this issue, this principle 
is to be borne in mind: where there is a 
fiduciary relationship, such as between 
corporate officers and a stockholder, the 
Statute of Limitations does not begin to 
run until the stockholder discovers, or 
in the exercise of reasonable care should 
discover, that there is a wrong to be 
complained of; and it hardly needs to be 
stated that this rule has application 
where funds are wrongfully withheld from 
stockholders." 
While this case is dealing with a different statute 
than was being dealt with in the Stewart case, the principle 
is essentially the same because of the fiduciary relation-
ship that exists between the attorney and his client, which 
is probably of a higher quality, and in which there is more 
trust and confidence reposed than that of a corporate 
officer toward a stockholder. 
Whether you apply the Damage Rule or the Discovery 
Rule, the evidence in this case is clear that the appellant 
did not discover, and would have no reason to be on inquiry 
to make a discovery of the respondent's legal malpractice 
until he attempted to enforce his security interest after 
his obligor fs bankruptcy was filed. Until that time pay-
ments were made by the contract buyers, and there was no 
reason for him to make an independent determination, based 
upon the trust he had reposed in the respondent, to deter-
mine whether the respondent had done what he had been hired 
to do, namely, to secure the transaction with a security 
interest in both real property and personal property. 
The damage did not occur, and the respondent's error 
and omission would not be reasonably discoverable, until it 
was necessary for the appellant to take some action to exe-
cute on his security after his contract buyers filed the 
bankruptcy. If you do not apply such reasoning, then it is 
incumbent on all clients to hire a second attorney every 
time their initial attorney prepares a contract for them 
because, in the usual course of events dealing with con-
tracts that extend over a period of years, the event that 
gives rise to a cause of action will not occur until after 
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the Statute runs in many contract cases. The nature of the 
relationship of the attorney/client is such that the client 
of necessity reposes great confidence and trust in his 
attorney, and is not likely to seek a second opinion to have 
another attorney review the work of the first attorney. 
This court in Brigham Young University v. Paulsen 
Construction Company, et al., 68 UAR 5 (Utah 1987), had 
occasion to discuss the Discovery Rule, but not to apply it 
because of the peculiar facts of that case in that BYU knew 
of its cause of action against Paulsen for a sufficient 
period of time prior to the running of the Statute of Limi-
tations to have commenced their action in a timely fashion, 
but consciously elected not to until after the Statute had 
run. The court cited, however, Meyers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 
84, 86 (Utah 1981), where it sanctioned the invocation of 
the Discovery Rule when the "application of the general rule 
would be irrational or unjust.11 The concurring opinion of 
Justice Howe, concurred in by Associate Chief Justice 
Stewart, cited a Federal Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit decision which has application in this case. In 
citing City of Aurora v. Bechtel Corporation, 599 F. 2d 382 
(10th Cir. 1979), Justice Howe, noting the case involved a 
professional malpractice claim where the Discovery Rule was 
applied, stated: 
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"*** Logically, I cannot see why if we 
applied the Discovery Rule in cases for 
professional negligence, the same rule 
should not also be applied in cases for 
breach of contract where the breach is 
a latent defect in the construction which 
becomes apparent only after the Statute 
of Limitations has otherwise run.*** The 
Statute of Limitations does not begin to 
run on a negligence claim until the 
damage is discovered, which may be after 
the limitation on a contract action has 
expired." 
CONCLDSIONS 
The trial court used the wrong date in determining when 
the malpractice occurred relative to the filing of the 
U.C.C. 1, and as a matter of law the correct date should 
have been May, 1981, and not May, 1976. This action was 
filed in July, 1984, well within the four years allowed by 
the Contract Statute of Limitations. 
The trial court further erred in the application of the 
Occurrence Rule, with the occurrence being the creation of 
an inadequate contract in 1976, rather than the application 
of the Discovery Rule, or the Damage Rule, which would have 
the logical baseline date as to when the Statute commenced 
to run as a reasonable time after the filing of the bank-
ruptcy and the appellant's discovery that the respondent had 
not filed a U.C.C. 1 renewal in 1981, or secured the obliga-
tion of the buyers with an appropriate lien against the real 
property. 
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The Summary Judgment of the trial court should be 
reversed, and the case remanded for a trial on its merits 
for a determination of whether the respondent committed 
legal malpractice, and the damages that have resulted to the 
appellant as a result thereof. 
Respectfully submitted this gl ^^ day of February, 1988. 
"WENDELL E. BENNETT 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the fore-
going to Henry S. Nygaard, attorney for respondent, 333 
North 300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103, on this J> <~/ 
day of February, 1988. 
j j JL^JUM T. ^L^~M 
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